Code signing
Code signing today usually means a single maintainer (or a single HSM) holds the signing key. A compromise of that maintainer, or of the HSM’s PIN, lets an attacker sign malware that looks legitimate.
Confium’s threshold code signing replaces the single-key model with a multi-maintainer scheme. T-of-N maintainers must participate to produce a valid release signature.
What you get
- Every release signature requires quorum (e.g. 2-of-3 lead maintainers).
- The signature is a standard PGP, CMS, or Sigstore signature — existing verifiers (package managers, OS vendors) accept it unchanged.
- The signing key never exists on any single maintainer’s machine.
- Every signing event is anchored in the transparency log, so silent releases are detectable.
Deployment shape
Each maintainer runs a Confium signer process. The release pipeline calls the coordinator with the artifact hash; the coordinator collects signatures from the participating maintainers; the final signature is published alongside the release.
[ Release pipeline ]
|
| submit artifact hash
v
[ Coordinator ] --------------------+
| | | |
v v v v
[Maintainer 1] [Maintainer 2] [Maintainer N] -> [ Transparency log ]
^ |
| |
+----- final signature published -----------+
Sigstore-style integration
The deployment can mirror Sigstore’s architecture: short-lived signing keys, identity-based attestation, transparency log inclusion. The difference: the signing key isn’t held by a central authority, it’s held by a threshold of maintainers.
Post-quantum readiness
Code signing is one of the highest-value targets for PQ migration — signatures embedded in long-lived releases will be verified for decades. Confium’s composite signatures let you add an ML-DSA-65 component alongside your existing classical signature today. See PQ migration.
When to choose this use case
- You sign releases for a package manager, OS vendor, or app store.
- A single maintainer holding the key is a recognized operational risk.
- You want defense-in-depth against future algorithm breaks.